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Beginning Critical Theory 
At the beginning of 1930, Theodor W. Adorno, who was only 28 years old, was awarded 
the venia legendi (teaching permission) for philosophy and the academic title “Privat-
dozent”, after his Habilitationsschrift (on Kierkegaard) had been accepted by the faculty 
of philosophy on the basis of two positive reviews, by Adorno’s older friend and mentor 
Max Horkheimer and the prominent theologian-philosopher Paul Tillich. This title tradi-
tionally comes without academic position or pay, but is the precondition for applications 
for the position of professor. In early May, he was obliged to give his inaugural lecture to 
the academic public, and he chose a rather programmatic subject, “The Actuality of Phi-
losophy”, using the occasion for a rigorous critique of the major trends in current Ger-
man academic philosophy and a bold statement concerning the possible future of a cer-
tain kind of materialist philosophy which he was just about to develop. 
 In retrospect, this short text has been interpreted as one of the first and most signif-
icant formulations of what since Max Horkheimer’s famous programmatic article on 
“Traditional and Critical Theory” from 1937 came to be known as “Critical Theory”. Its 
status can only be compared to a text from 1931 by Horkheimer himself, on the current 
state of social philosophy and on the interdisciplinary program of the Institute for Social 
Research (cf. Horkheimer 1993), founded in 1924 and led by him since late 1930. By 
1937, the Institute of course had already left Germany in an effort to keep up its work 
with a reduced group of researchers dispersed over different places. It is therefore plau-
sible to treat the early texts, by both Horkheimer and Adorno, as more or less authentic 
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The Now of Philosophy 
Seen from this angle, it is striking how Adorno’s inaugural lecture leads up to a concep-
tion of a critical philosophy that is not dogmatic, not a systematic and more or less co-
herent doctrine or social theory, but essentially diagnostic: a critical assessment of the 
present. Commenting rather aggressively on Heidegger’s existential philosophy, Sim-
mel’s “philosophy of life”, Husserl’s formal and Scheler’s material phenomenology, 
Adorno poses as the question of the foremost philosophical urgency the “question of 
philosophy’s actuality” (A: 124), its relation to the problems and solutions of the pre-
sent.2 Adorno accepts that this might – in accordance with the progressive wing of the 
Vienna Circle – result in seeing philosophy as a sort of “science” that contributes to the 
production of new knowledge and new possibilities of changing the societies we live in. 
But he opts for a special, non-scientistic status for philosophy: the ideal, goal, or “idea of 
science [Wissenschaft] is research [Forschung]; [however,] that of philosophy is interpre-
tation [Deutung]” (A: 124 [334]).3 
 Here, a rather peculiar and fascinating concept of philosophizing can be found, one 
that is at the same time intimately tied to the social world it inhabits and seeks to make 
sense of (being in this sense empirical, even empiricist), but also creatively transcending 
it and interpreting it in ways in which it hasn’t been looked at and understood before. 
And it is here that I see a deep, indeed striking, conceptual and methodological parallel 
to Deleuze’s kind of critical diagnostic work, of which the “Postscript on Control Socie-
ties”, in its attempt to decipher the internal logic of contemporary society, is a major ex-
ample. I will come back to this parallel in the second half of my discussion. 
 
Reading Society 
But what then, for Adorno, is “interpretation” (or Deutung)? A striking feature of his ar-
gumentation is that it remains rather vague, or metaphorical, and has recourse to a re-
curring trope, that of the “figure” (Figur) that is to be constructed in philosophical work. 
Philosophy does not solve an already clear question or “riddle”, but it “has to bring its 
elements, which it receives from the sciences, into changing constellations, or, into 
                                                        
2 References in the following passages refer to this text (“A” = Adorno 1977). Whenever I use original 
terms or phrases or have changed the translation, the page reference to the German version (Adorno 
1973) is given in square brackets.  
3 It seems plausible that Adorno might have also thought of his friend Kracauer’s work in which the “in-
conspicuous surface-level expressions” are treated as symptomatic of an “epoch” since they “provide un-
mediated access to the fundamental substance of the state of things”. Also for Kracauer, for example in his 
famous essay on the “Mass Ornament” from 1927, “knowledge of this state of things depends on the inter-
pretation of these surface-level expressions”, since the “fundamental substance of an epoch and its un-
heeded impulses illuminate each other reciprocally” (Kracauer 1995: 57). On the systematic context of 
Kracauer’s cultural criticism, cf. Huyssen 2018. 
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changing trial combinations, until they fall into a figure [in wechselnde Versuchsanord-
nungen zu bringen, bis sie zur Figur geraten]”, so that a problem or problematic becomes 
visible for the first time (A: 127 [335]). Philosophy’s force lies in its “power of construct-
ing figures, or images [Bilder], out of the isolated elements of reality” (ibid.). 
 This means, however, that philosophy, unlike the social sciences that provide it with 
its material, does not merely take up or replicate social reality, but is actually construct-
ing or creating something, namely a distinctive “figure” or “image” of social reality. This 
is indeed a rather technical, constructive task; the “trial combinations” just cited refer 
metaphorically to the laboratory setup in scientific experiments. So “interpretation” in 
this sense, as Adorno explicitly states, is not meant to reveal any hidden or implicit “in-
tentions” but “to interpret unintentional reality” precisely by way of “the power of con-
structing figures, or images”. Referencing Benjamin’s book on the German Trauerspiel 
from 1928, Adorno calls this the “program of every authentically materialist knowledge 
[Erkenntnis]” (ibid.).4 
 These rather abstract and enigmatic formulations occur in varying forms without 
being specified more clearly. There is only one passage where “an example as a thought 
experiment” is given for this possibility “to group the elements of a social analysis in 
such a manner that the way they came together made a figure [derart zu gruppieren, daß 
ihr Zusammenhang eine Figur ausmacht, in der jedes einzelne Moment aufgehoben ist] 
which certainly does not lie before us organically, but which must first be posited 
[hergestellt]”; and this example is the core notion of any Marxist account of capitalist 
society, namely “the commodity structure [Warenform]” or commodity-form (A: 128 
[337]). 
 So the one example Adorno gives is indeed a rather well-known one, namely the 
idea that capitalist society is structured by the commodity form as its basic law and core 
logic through and through. But, Adorno contends, this idea is not in itself a thought or 
cognition that can be derived or deduced from social analysis as such; rather, it is the 
effect of the figure or image the social philosopher constructs or draws. He makes us see 
that this is the law and the logic of capitalist society by arranging the (empirically given) 
social elements in a certain way, by actively bringing them into a constellation that 
makes us see that this is their inner mechanism. 
 To understand capitalist societies in such a way therefore is the outcome of a specif-
ic interpretation (or Deutung), not a fact to be observed or described directly. The imag-
es have to be constructed to be seen, they are “not simply self-given [keine bloßen Selbst-
                                                        
4 Cf. Benjamin 2019 and, for commentary, Ross 2016. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion, it 
would be a challenging task to relate Benjamin’s “dialectical image”, which was enormously influential for 
Adorno, to Deleuze’s “image of thought”. For introductions to these essential and complex concepts in 
both theories, cf. Hillach 2000 and Rajchman 2000 respectively. 
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gegebenheiten]”, but “they must be produced” (A: 131 [341]). And they are valuable for 
what they are “in the last analysis alone by the fact that reality crystalizes about them in 
striking conclusiveness [daß in schlagender Evidenz die Wirklichkeit um sie zusam-
menschießt]” (ibid.). Philosophical intelligibility, as it were, is the effect of interpretation, 
not of observation or research. It is the outcome of a construction that is in itself figural 
or imaginal. This formal construction of a totality out of many elements is an act of mak-
ing us see a coherent whole, a Zusammenhang, while empirical reality until now just 
gave the impression of an incoherent ensemble of many different, plural, non-cohering 
phenomena. 
 While these remarks might sound so general that there is no indication as to what 
realm the figures or images belong to, the reference to the commodity-form, to material-
ism and Marxism makes explicit what is implicit in the entire text, especially in its criti-
cal parts attacking the bourgeois trends in the current German academy. Adorno osten-
sibly inscribes himself into a tradition and discourse of Marxist philosophizing that 
seeks the alliance with a certain kind of social scientific analysis and that tries to align 
itself with certain political struggles and social movements. The reference to the com-
modity-form clearly indicates that the law and logic to be revealed by way of construct-
ing a figure or an image of society refers to the very fact, or the face, of domination in a 
given society. It is, ultimately, the figure or image of capital that is made visible in high-
lighting and outlining the centrality and pervasiveness of the commodity-form for the 
totality of capitalist societies. 
 So the social philosopher will not just search for any pattern or structure, she will 
try to draw the lines where society itself draws them, between classes, identities, status-
es, between those who have and can – and those who do not. Constructing the figure of a 
class society, we might infer, means tracing its (often hidden) class structure, outlining 
its (rather implicit) divisions and grouping its (seemingly multiple and incoherent) ef-
fects on individual behavior, self-understanding and situation in such a way that their 
common structure or determination becomes visible, which also means: intelligible. But 
since this profile or face is one of domination, the new visibility or intelligibility is not 
neutral; it is no new objective fact about the state of affairs, but a highly political insight. 
 In formulations that owe more to Hegel and Marx than most others in this essay, 
Adorno can therefore directly align philosophical interpretation and social transfor-
mation: “The interpretation of given reality and its negation [Aufhebung] are connected 
to each other, not, of course, in the sense that reality is negated [aufgehoben] in the con-
cept, but that from the construction of a certain figure of reality [Figur des Wirklichen] 
the demand for reality’s real transformation follows promptly“ (A: 129 [338]). If the ob-
ject of interpretation is social reality itself and if this specific social reality is shown or 
made visible as a figure and pattern of power and domination, this reality can and will 
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provoke counter-power and the desire for emancipation. If, in other words, this philo-
sophical construction or interpretation is to be successful, it will in itself generate some 
transformative, revolutionary force. To philosophically interpret or decipher society as 
it is means conjuring the energies that can make it otherwise. 
 
The New in the Present 
It would be dishonest to neglect the many open questions this program of a critical, in-
terpretative philosophy still poses. Even its most central idea, the idea of interpretation 
(or Deutung), seems overdetermined. Neither speculative nor empirical, neither purely 
conceptual nor aesthetic, but constructive and receptive at the same time, this operation 
seems to presuppose the material of social-scientific analysis and transcend it at the 
same time. But neither the exact methodological forms of this intellectual exercise nor 
its exact conditions of success seem to be outlined sufficiently. While the strong reliance 
on, or even presupposition of (a kind of) Marxist social analysis is openly acknowledged, 
it seems hard to determine the systematic status of this theory. While the formalist 
character of this form of interpretation seems to rely on the striking effect of producing 
immediate evidence, it appears hard to justify the supposition of a unified coherent to-
tality.5 
 It would be equally dishonest to claim that the kind of analysis the “Postscript on 
Control Societies” is trying to perform works exactly along the same lines as the early 
Adorno’s experimental critical philosophy. This would mean neglecting the deep concep-
tual, methodological and systematic differences underlying the two projects, many of 
which relate back to the completely different background theories they are rooted in. On 
the one hand, there is a level on which Critical Theory and Poststructuralism have to be 
seen as alternative, competing philosophical frameworks that might share some general 
goals, like the critical demystification of social relations and regimes of meaning, even 
though their means, strategies and methods are hardly compatible.6 
 But on the other hand, specifically with regards to the two texts at hand, there is a 
striking, even uncanny, resemblance on the performative, textual level on which Deleuze 
in his famous text seems to practice something rather alike the critical-constructive 
analysis Adorno is calling for. Both subscribe to the view that the ultimate task of phi-
losophy is reading, deciphering the present and capturing the characteristics and fea-
tures of our present society. Both determine these features in formal terms and call for a 
formalist, one might even say quasi-structuralist, type of analysis which results in the 
                                                        
5 Cf. Jay 1984 for the theoretical history of the concept of ‘totality’, and Demirović 1994 for a systematic 
discussion. 
6 For my general view on the relation between Critical Theory and Poststructuralism, cf. Saar 2018b. 
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creation of a thought-image, a profile of this society. Both identify power as the decisive 
dimension to determine the specificity of our present, seeking to identify a specific pat-
tern or structure of power that constitutes the very logic of current social relations. And 
both, finally, understand their analysis as contributing to the very struggle in which the 
immanent forces to transform, overcome or at least resist this pattern of power and/or 
domination can be articulated, and perhaps even supported, by theoretical or philosoph-
ical work. 
 Seen in the light of these similarities and analogies, the “Postscript on Control Socie-
ties” can first be viewed as contributing not only to a discussion opened up by Foucault’s 
writings on power and discipline in the mid-1970s. It can also be seen as part of a theo-
retical passion for the question of the present as it was introduced by Kant and radical-
ized by Left-Hegelian philosophy in the first half of the 19th century and taken up by 20th 
century Neo-Marxism (from Lukács to Gramsci to Negri), where the material (and mate-
rialist) diagnosis of the emergence, structure and future of modern societies became the 
most urgent question. This can be seen as a translation of the traditional question of the 
Enlightenment (“what can be thought and how can we act today, in the present?”) into a 
social register (“what can be thought, experienced and done within the epistemic re-
gimes, social structures and subject positions operative and available in this given socie-
ty?”). 
 Second, Deleuze’s reflections can be placed alongside other attempts (from Tocque-
ville to Weber to Luhmann) to understand the specificity of modern or late-modern 
forms of power that have evolved and have changed shape, from more personal, hierar-
chical and institution-based to more informal, ubiquitous and reversible forms of power 
that have adapted to democratic conditions and capitalist circuits of exploitation. And 
third and finally, this sketch of a new form of society emerging in the midst of an older 
one can – maybe surprisingly – be seen as part of a discourse (from Landauer to Marcu-
se to de Certeau) centered on the question of the immanent possibilities and the effec-
tive forms of resistance and counter-conduct within a given structure of power and 
domination. 
 
Drawing the Figure of Power (around 1990) 
It is not necessary in this context to resume either the overall argument or the different 
steps of the “Postscript on Control Societies”. I will confine myself to some remarks pro-
ceeding from my impression that on the more formal, methodological level, Deleuze is 
after something quite similar as Adorno in his project of a critical, interpretative social 
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philosophy.7 In broad strokes, Deleuze proceeds by amassing evidence for the diagnosis 
of a shift or transformation in the social structure and the forms of power inhabiting and 
stabilizing it. The method of this argument is formalist or structural, it lists and con-
fronts different elements, types and forms of social relations and institutions along the 
line of discipline vs. control (leading to the following oppositions: analogical vs. digital 
[cf. D: 178]; confinement vs. dispersion; exclusion vs. inclusion [cf. 179]; finitude vs. in-
finity; “simple machines” vs. “thermodynamic machines” [cf. 180]; production vs. meta-
production [cf. 181]; etc.). 
 All of these steps in the argument add to the suggestion that “we’re at the beginning 
of something new” (D: 182). But this new form of society is not just characterized by 
new technologies, social forms or institutions but by a change of shape of the social it-
self, of the way social life in general is organized and structured. This argument is based 
on the notion that societies are structures of power, entities that generate, distribute 
and manage possibilities and impossibilities, agencies and the limits to agency. Deleuze’s 
seemingly offhand remark that it is not easily possible to normatively rank the different 
types of society because there “is a conflict in each [system] between the ways they free 
and enslave us [car c’est en chacun d’eux que s’affrontent les libérations et les asservisse-
ments]” (D: 178 [242]) reveals a rather substantial social-theoretical axiom: In all socie-
ties, be they (following the Foucauldian lexicon) sovereign, disciplinary or governmen-
tal, or be they (following the traditional political semantics) hierarchical, authoritarian 
or liberal, there is a pattern or structure that administers legitimate and illegitimate, 
possible and impossible, normative and a-normative life. 
 In all cases, “freedom” (i.e. the empowerment and authorization to act and live in a 
certain way) and “enslavement” (i.e. the sanctioning and weakening of the excluded, dis-
carded or delegitimated forms of life) are distributed systematically; all societies are 
regimes or machines of subjectivations that simultaneously “free and enslave”, that is, 
create the power to act as well as subjugate subjects and actions to power. But the 
modes, modalities or forms of this double subjectivation are different depending on the 
respective set of institutions, values, technologies or ideologies. It will make a difference 
whether the major subjectivizing mechanisms are organized around the law, or produc-
tion, or natural features, whether there are more or less developed norms of scientific 
inquiry, theological authority or bodily pleasure placed at the center of a given society’s 
mode of operation. All these differences allow for a wide variety of forms of social organ-
ization and self-constitution. The task of a critical diagnosis is to bring to light the speci-
ficity of a given social formation. 
                                                        
7 References in the remaining body of the text mostly refer to the English version of the “Postscript on 
Control Societies” (“D” = Deleuze 1995). Phrases from the original French version (Deleuze 2003) are 
inserted in square brackets. 
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 It is here that the Adornian idea or technique of the construction of the “figure” or 
“image” can help to elucidate Deleuze’s own methodology. Looked at from this perspec-
tive, the concept of “control society” itself would be nothing else than such a figure, a 
theoretico-diagnostic construction. It is meant to grasp and describe an emerging social 
formation that cannot yet be analyzed fully but that is starting to delineate itself in some 
key features that can be traced in the form of the open-ended list quoted above. The the-
orist or diagnostician, in this case Deleuze himself, draws this figure or profile, outlines a 
distinct entity that has not yet fully formed, that is far less substantial and “real” than it 
might seem; it is nothing but an image. But what it is an image of is the totality of social 
relations it is possible to think, made visible through those very features and their co-
herent, self-enforcing interconnections. In a “control society”, an increasing number of 
strata and levels would be structured and patterned by the imperatives of short-circuit 
control, psycho-affective activation and homoeostatic self-regulation that is characteris-
tic of production and communication under the conditions of late and generalized capi-
talism.8 
 This diagnosis is not itself a theory, it is not a piece or result of “research” (A: 124]). 
Nothing in the empirical social world can verify or justify the ultra-strong claim that the 
totality of the social is structured in this (and no other) way. This is nothing more, but 
also nothing less than an “interpretation” (or Deutung), a theoretical construction in-
tended to make sense of a given social formation, assessing its inner possibilities and 
impossibilities, its freedoms and enslavements. In other words, naming the present soci-
ety the emergent site of a “control society” means drawing boundaries, marking off the 
old and the new, the distinctive and the accidental. The epistemic function of such a con-
struction is to let us see what might be new or emerging in the present and what it might 
be like to live in a society that would have fully developed this shape or form or image. 
The political function of this construction is that it allows us to imagine the deep forces 
and powers that shape subjectivity, knowledge and self-understanding under such a re-
gime and that assure its functioning. Imaging or envisioning these forces and powers 
that at the same time provide “new freedoms” as they produce “enslavement” (cf. D: 
178) is not yet fully understanding, let alone combating them. It is only the first step to 
build up resources that might break their unnoticed efficiency. 
 
Preparing Resistance 
If it is plausible to interpret Deleuze’s text in such a way, and to impose the expectation 
of at least a sketch of such a construction on it, it may make sense to go even further in 
testing out the analogy. In Adorno’s case, the idea of a construction of an image or figure 
                                                        
8 For a compelling account of the enduring value of Deleuze’s diagnosis, cf. Mühlhoff 2018: 355-73. 
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of power or domination was framed in Marxist terms and was also meant to contribute 
to a perspective in which the hypothetical theoretical insight is related to the practical 
dimension of a struggle against a given power structure or regime of domination. Now, it 
seems that Deleuze rejects exactly these clear-cut terms and divisions and, here as in 
many other texts, opts for a much more immanent and apparently less normative per-
spective. He might share some aspects with Adorno’s peculiar form of Critical Theory, 
but they seem to part ways at this point for good.9 
 But then again, it is striking to see how explicit some of the text’s passages are in this 
regard. Be it the quest for “finding new weapons” (D: 178) or the blunt statement on the 
last page that the new society is nothing but “a new system of domination” (D: 182 
[247]). And even the final passage is explicit in its political-practical point of reference: 
“Can one already glimpse the outlines [ébauches] of […] future forms of resistance“? 
(Ibid.) But the caveat lies in the next sentence: “Many young people have a strange crav-
ing [réclament] to be ‘motivated,’ they’re always asking for special courses and continu-
ing education”; this can be taken to refer to the problem that even the impulse to learn, 
to advance and emancipate oneself might be rooted in the very mechanisms that serve 
to maintain the functionality of the new system. But, Deleuze continues, “it’s their job to 
discover whose ends these serve, just as older people discovered, with considerable dif-
ficulty, who was benefiting from disciplines [la finalité des disciplines].” (Ibid.) This is not 
just the expression of a mild sympathy for the next generation which has to pick its own 
fight and experience its own disillusionments. It is a general philosophical lesson: The 
urge and resources for resistance will only be available from the inside of a given regime 
of power and domination. This will require specific defeats and disappointments but 
also processes of learning and detecting possibilities and loop holes. 
 Resistance, we might say, will therefore be a matter of immanence: it will be imma-
nent to the structures of power against which it is to be yielded, but also immanent in 
the sense that no one else but the ones living under these regimes can figure out how to 
resist. So here too, but with a different meaning than in the Hegelian lexicon, the Nie-
tzschean Deleuze proposes and opts for a kind of “immanent critique” (Deleuze 2002: 
91). This refers to a resistance from within, which transcends neither its point of depar-
ture nor its object of critique completely. But if it is successful, it manages to transform 
both of them (and the resister/critic, too). 
 If these descriptions are at least partially plausible, we can attribute to Deleuze a 
type of critical theorizing that can be brought into dialogue with the project of an inter-
pretative critical philosophy, as the young Adorno had envisioned it. While the systemat-
ic differences are of course considerable (concerning the status of the dialectic, the con-
                                                        
9 On the controversial topic of Deleuze’s stance towards questions of normativity, cf. Patton 2010, whose 
fascinating discussion of the subject may in fact strengthen my argument. 
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cept of totality, the conception of terms such as ‘power’ and ‘domination’, etc.), there is 
nevertheless a level on which the convergence is striking: Both projects are constructive, 
even poetic in that they insist on the philosophical and conceptual character of this Criti-
cal Theory even while it refers to the very specificity of a given social order. Both are 
organized around the problem of power and domination and read and treat society as 
nothing else than figures and instances of power. And lastly, both outlooks are skeptical, 
but not cynical, since the problem of power inherently, immanently, leads to the theme 
and possibility of resistance. The analysis of power in the last instance gives way to a 
reflection on the very possibility of not letting power have, as it were, the last word.10 
 
Critical Theory after Deleuze 
If this rapprochement between two seemingly distant perspectives has some value for 
understanding Deleuze differently, does this also hold true for the other way around? If 
Deleuze can be said to practice a kind of Critical Theory, how could this constellation 
affect the reading and rethinking of early and current Critical Theory? Let me just give 
some indications as to where these questions might lead. 
 Without doubt, the work of Foucault and Deleuze has raised the philosophical theo-
ry of power to a new level and this has revolutionized the very way in which power as a 
conceptual object can be understood and brought into theoretical contexts. While in a 
rather loose sense, both early Critical Theory and Deleuze’s thought can be said to be 
philosophies of power, the former more often than not remains rooted in a more tradi-
tional understanding of power and domination, with a clear-cut line between the having 
and not-having of power, unambiguous demarcations between the powerful and the 
powerless, and a rather simple view of the distribution of power resources.11 
 While some of these aspects are connected to the Marxist core of early Critical Theo-
ry and hardly dispensable, others are rather contingent and might be said to unneces-
sarily block other perspectives. Reading Critical Theory with and after Deleuze may lead 
to ways of integrating the decentered, dispersed and differential character of power into 
the more robust class-theoretical register common to Neo-Marxism. Then it might also 
become possible to realize that not all figures that can be drawn diagnostically into the 
social matrix today will necessarily and exclusively refer to economic power and class 
struggle; there might be other lines of sexist, racist or imperial division, and there might 
even be a special place for a figure of migration or the migrant that may well appear as 
the most pertinent signature of our time. 
                                                        
10 For an extended argument of this point, cf. Saar 2018, 2020. 
11 For a comprehensive discussion of Deleuze’s concept of power, cf. Rölli 2017. 
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 Adorno and his Marxist contemporaries understood themselves in strong opposi-
tion to existential philosophy and fundamental ontology (cf. A: 123-24, 30-31); this po-
lemic affected their attitude towards ontological questions in general. It might be one of 
the most significant side-effects of the recent prominence of Deleuze within general so-
cial and cultural theory to enable a turn towards ontology beyond the narrow limits of 
orthodox Heideggerianism. While this is a theme more strongly developed in his more 
systematic writings, even the “Postscript on Control Societies” places heavy emphasis on 
the world-forming, constitutive and productive, i.e. ontological character of power. But 
this means that to account for a given form or type of power means to account for its 
constitutive-ontological effects, i.e. for the fact that it produces a certain social world and 
certain social agents or subjects and their mode of being. A critical social philosophy can 
therefore (also) entail a critical social or political ontology, and this will need to have 
conceptual and methodological implications many authors within the context of Critical 
Theory often shy away from.12 
 Finally, while the dialectical frame of early Critical Theory allowed for the conceptu-
alization of the ambivalent nature of social processes, the Deleuzian insistence on the 
immanent character of social relations could provide a helpful corrective against idealist 
residua in political thinking. While some of the political ambitions of the early Frankfurt 
School are premised on a rather Manichean vision of society, with a dark force of domi-
nation holding down a class of disenfranchised subjects, it is only with a much more 
complicated and multi-dimensional picture that contemporary political hopes, ambi-
tions and fears will find their full expression. What if every social order also rests on 
(some kind of) consent and acceptance? What if resistance remains tied to the forces it 
opposes and runs the structural danger of partially reproducing the very conditions it 
seeks to overcome? What if the affective constitution of modern subjects also rests on 
some form of internalized (even if frustrated) will to power, so that this psycho-
economy itself will potentially compromise all attempts to start totally anew, beyond 
hierarchy, beyond domination? 
 These are questions that do not lie completely, but largely outside the range of early 
and current Critical Theory (with notable exceptions); one can credit Deleuze (and oth-
ers) for making them crucial and defining questions for social theory today. In the “Post-
script on Control Societies”, the emphasis on immanence takes the form of a methodo-
logical imperative: to attack contemporary power, start from the ubiquitous surface el-
ements of the newly emerging type of society (work relations, styles of communication, 
psychological motivations), map them, reveal their coherence and contradictions, try to 
picture them as a system. To understand and to struggle against this type of society, we 
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do not need to go beyond it. The resistance against it comes from its inside, from the 
immanence of its own power. 
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